This piece is a preview of an upcoming report titled “One Network, Two Systems: The Research Security Risks of UK/China University Cyber Partnerships,” written by this author for UK-China Transparency (UKCT), a UK-based research and advocacy organization focused on issues related to transparency, governance, and national security in UK–China relations.

In the “Faux Amis” piece published in March 2026, Natto Thoughts mapped the European Union’s (EU) cyber-related university partnerships with China and found that France hosted the densest EU cluster of ties to Chinese institutions embedded in the country’s defense research ecosystem. The EU, though, is only part of the story. The same exercise applied to the United Kingdom (UK) reveals an exposure that is larger still – and, in some respects, harder to see.

The UK maintains more structured university partnerships with China than any European country. In cyber-related fields alone – cybersecurity, computer science, and telecommunications – the analysis conducted by this author for UK-China Transparency (UKCT) identified 34 UK–China partnerships, nearly as many as across all 27 EU member states combined. While academic cooperation with China delivers clear benefits, the UKCT report finds that some of these partnerships involve Chinese institutions deeply embedded in China’s defense research system, creating structural risks that the UK’s current research security framework is not designed to address: access to funding streams, doctoral pipelines, and laboratory environments that feed into China’s security apparatus, as well as potential pathways for illicit technology acquisition. Further risks include research agendas shaped by partner priorities and financial dependencies that discourage inquiry into sensitive topics.

This piece examines UK–China university cyber partnerships by comparing the structure of the UK and Chinese university systems, mapping the UK’s exposure to higher-risk partnerships, and presenting case studies of two high-risk Chinese universities: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT) and Beihang University. These cases illustrate how institutional structures, funding mechanisms, and personnel networks can connect ostensibly civilian research activities to China’s broader security and defense ecosystem. It then sets out policy recommendations for managing the risks associated with these partnerships.

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The episode reflects growing awareness in parts of the European Union (EU) about the strategic implications of university partnerships with Chinese institutions embedded in the country’s defense research system. However, it remains an isolated institutional reversal, with similar collaborations persisting in a number of countries. In December 2025, Beihang itself claimed to have “elevated European cooperation to new heights.”

Over the past decade, university cooperation between some EU member states and China has expanded rapidly across several fields. Many of these exchanges generate legitimate academic and economic benefits. However, some partner institutions are not simply civilian universities.1 They are formally authorized to conduct classified weapons equipment research and are structurally embedded in China’s military and defense industrial system, raising concerns about dual-use knowledge transfer – research with both civilian and military applications – access to EU funding streams, and long-term institutional exposure and influence aligned with defense research agendas.2

Cyber-related disciplines are particularly sensitive. Fields such as software engineering, telecommunications, computer science, and information security cultivate inherently dual-use skills. These capabilities support civilian digital infrastructure and defensive cybersecurity, but also enable cyber espionage – including intellectual property theft – offensive cyber operations, and applications such as secure military communications and strategic command systems. Such capabilities can be deployed remotely in both peacetime and conflict.

Within this landscape, France stands out. Among EU member states, it has the highest concentration of cyber partnerships involving Chinese institutions that hold state secrecy clearance or maintain formal ties to China’s defense establishment. This piece maps EU–China cyber-related joint degree partnerships, identifies institutional risk factors including security clearance status and defense affiliation, and examines the French case in depth. Beihang University’s School of Cyber Science and Technology serves as a central case study, including analysis of its state and defense industry ties and a review of research activities and affiliations of nearly 80 faculty members.

The Appendix identifies EU–China cyber-related partnerships and their disciplinary focus, highlights relevant risk factors, and explains the methodology used to assess institutional affiliations and involvement in classified research.

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